Abstract-In the past twenty years, the share of top incomes in Switzerland has risen, while exhibiting large variations. Switzerland is similar to European countries for the top 1% but closer to the United States for higher top income groups. With the synthetic control method, we close a time gap in the tax data, exploiting the fact that Swiss cantons changed their tax system at different points in time. Using social security data, which cover all top labor incomes, we document the growing importance of labor compared to capital incomes among top income earners in Switzerland.
I. Introduction
T HE evolution of inequality in income and wealth has again attracted substantial attention in recent decades. In the aftermath of the financial crisis, distributional issues have been discussed even more intensely in an effort to capture the relationship between distribution and growth patterns. In line with public interest, the academic focus has been notably on the top of the income distribution, in particular because changes in the very top incomes account for a large part of overall inequality in quantitative terms.
This paper studies the evolution of top incomes in Switzerland. The Swiss data are of interest because it is a major industrialized country with a large financial sector. Tax competition within Switzerland and the absence of wars have kept tax rates low and have not foreclosed possible wealth accumulation by rich households, unlike its European neighbors. Swiss top incomes are also worth studying because the Swiss social security system (AHV) has no upper income limit, which is different from most other industrialized countries. Hence, the AHV data cover all labor incomes, which makes it possible to study the evolution of top labor incomes and compare their dynamics with the dynamics of overall top incomes.
The seminal study by Thomas Piketty (2001) on the evolution of top incomes in France using tax data, covering the time span 1901 to 1998, found broad interest and was followed by a range of similar studies on other countries.
Internationally, top deciles and percentiles experienced considerable changes in their total income shares during the twentieth century. Until the end of World War II, most countries experienced a sharp drop in top income shares. For the second half of the twentieth century, a U-shaped evolution can be observed, yet this varies considerably across countries. The continental European countries, including Switzerland, and Japan experienced almost no or only a modest increase in top income shares from the 1970s onward, while there was a remarkably strong increase in Western English-speaking countries (Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez, 2011) . Piketty (2007, 2010 ) provide a collection of these studies. Dell, Piketty, and Saez (2007) study top incomes in Switzerland. The data used in their study reach back into the 1930s. Unfortunately, the tax data end in 1995-1996 when a major reform in the Swiss tax system took place. As described in section II, not all cantons adopted the changes at the same time, resulting in a lack of uniform data for the whole country for the transition period 1995 to 2002.
The first contribution of this paper is to close this large data gap. We use a novel approach to estimate missing data and describe top incomes in a period that delineates a break with the former decades of steady growth rates and full employment. In the 1990s, Switzerland experienced a decade of very low growth and a remarkable increase in the unemployment rate from 1.8% in 1991 to 4.3% in 1997, accompanied by ongoing immigration. Because tax data are available at the cantonal level for every year, including the transition period, we estimate in section III the distribution of taxable income in the missing years and extend the series to 2010, the latest year for which tax statistics are available so far. 1 Concerning methods, we apply the synthetic control method of Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller (2010) for a new purpose: to construct aggregate time series when the underlying time series of the subgroups have missing values.
Our second contribution is the use of income data from the AHV statistics to estimate the distribution of (top) labor earnings in Switzerland, covering the period 1981 to 2010. Our results suggest that the increase in top labor incomes is instrumental in explaining the rise in top total incomes, as the latter follow the former closely. The AHV data have the additional advantage that the individual values are available, which allows calculating the top quantiles precisely and judging the accuracy of the Pareto approximation widely 794 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS used in the study of top incomes. The results show how precise this method is in estimating top income shares.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives a short introduction to the Swiss tax system and describes the data used to estimate the top income shares in section III. Section IV presents the results on top income shares for total incomes. The role of labor incomes at the top is assessed in section V, along with estimates of the concentration of wealth. Section VI concludes.
II. Data and Methodology

A. On the Use of Tax Data for Economic Research
Piketty's 2001 study on top income shares in France in the long run initiated a new wave of research on the dynamics of top incomes in different countries (for a collection of these studies, see Atkinson & Piketty, 2007 . The crucial innovation compared to earlier studies on income distribution is the use of long time series, going back to the beginning of the twentieth century. This is an important feature as "structural changes in income and wealth distribution often span several decades" (Piketty & Saez, 2006, p. 200) . To study long time periods, tax data are the only reliable data available, as household income surveys did not exist for a long time, differ in frequency or suffer from incomparability, and fail to capture the entire income distribution. Tax data have the advantage that they cover a much larger population sample than household survey data-in some cases, the entire population.
The use of tax data, however, does not come without drawbacks. The main concern is misreporting of income, as there are incentives for tax evasion to do so. With a progressive tax system in place, misreporting and tax evasion are more attractive for higher incomes. However, when using data from household surveys, one should also be concerned about nonresponse, sampling errors, and top-coded incomes. These problems particularly affect top income earners (see, e.g., Brewer et al., 2008 , for the United Kingdom, and Burkhauser et al., 2012 , for the United States; on the peculiarities of survey data in general, see Victoria-Feser, 2000, and Diekmann, 2004) . When turning to the estimation of top income shares and inequality measures, these disadvantages lead to erroneous results. For the United States, Atkinson et al. (2011) estimate that CPS survey data fail to capture about half of the overall increase in inequality measured by the Gini coefficient, confirming previous results by Alvaredo (2011) . The latter further shows that the Gini coefficient estimated with income survey data not only underestimates the changes in income inequality when compared to the one estimated with tax data, but the trends in inequality measured by Gini coefficients may even diverge, as is the case for Argentina.
The second disadvantage of tax data often mentioned is its definition of income. Because the data are collected as part of an administrative process, the definitions of income and income units are not tailored to their corresponding definitions in economic theory and practice. This also implies that substantial changes in the tax law, such as income splitting for married couples, have to be taken into account when attempting to construct homogeneous time series. The concrete limitations emerging from the definition of income imposed by the tax system in Switzerland are discussed in the next section.
B. The Swiss Tax System over Time
In Switzerland, personal income taxes are levied at the federal, cantonal, and municipal levels. Cantons are responsible for the tax collection at all three levels. For what follows, however, only the federal income tax system and data are of relevance.
In the mid-1990s, a fundamental change in the Swiss tax system took place by switching from the two-yearsbased praenumerando taxation to the one-year based postnumerando taxation. 2 The phrase "praenumerando method" refers to the fact that the assessment period and the fiscal period do not coincide under such a tax system: the assessment period precedes the fiscal period (Eidgenössische Steuerverwaltung ESTV, 2003) . The tax liability for a fiscal period was thus calculated from an estimated income stream based on past income, and taxes were adapted only to a new income situation or changed living conditions (e.g., marriage, birth of a child) in the next fiscal period. In order to adapt to significant changes in taxable income, often a betwixt assessment (called Zwischenveranlagung) became necessary.
In 1990, the change to the postnumerando taxation with a one-year assessment basis was enacted, yet allowing for a transition period of several years, during which each canton could choose when to adopt the new system. For this reason, no uniform tax data were published at the federal level during the transitional period from 1995 to 2002; only data at the cantonal level are available. Table D .2 in online appendix D shows the time schedule of the adoption of the new taxation method by canton. Basel-Stadt was the only canton that had always used the one-year-based postnumerando taxation method to levy its cantonal taxes. All other cantons had to adapt their tax systems.
The transition caused a gap in the assessment of incomes and taxes. The following example for Zurich shows the nature of this gap. Under praenumerando taxation, incomes realized in the 1995-1996 assessment period are recorded and published in the 1997-1998 fiscal period. The crucial difference to the postnumerando taxation is that under the latter, the assessment period equals the fiscal period, so for the fiscal periods 1999 and 2000, when the new system was in place, the tax base was the income earned in 1999 and 2000, respectively. This implies that income realized in 1997-1998 was never taxed and does not show up in any statistics (see table D.1 in the online appendix for an illustration of the system change). To avoid loopholes in the tax system, transitory provisions had been enacted, but these differed among cantons (for more information, see Eidgenössiche Steuerverwaltung ESTV, 2003) .
C. The Swiss Tax Statistics
The grouped tax data. Swiss tax statistics, (published by the Federal Tax Administration ESTV, www.estv.admin.ch), are grouped according to income brackets containing the total number of tax units and total income within each bracket. The cantons are the administrative unit in charge of the collection of the tax returns and the taxes. This mechanism ensures that information on incomes is available at the cantonal and federal levels at the same time and in the same format. The definitions of tax units and incomes tabulated in the tax statistics have remained fairly stable over time, allowing comparisons over time and between cantons. 3 However, the change from praenumerando to postnumerando taxation had one substantial impact on the tax statistics. The years indicated in these statistics refer to the fiscal period, which means that under the praenumerando method, reported incomes were realized in the two preceding years, but after the change, the reported incomes were realized in the year reported. As a consequence, data on realized incomes are missing for the period preceding the change.
With respect to inequality measures and top income shares, the change from the biennial to the annual tax schedule would be expected to make a difference due to the averaging effect of the biennial tax assessment. Yearly fluctuations in earned income, which alter the measured inequality of a distribution, are dampened when income is measured only once every two years.
Tax units covered in the statistics. Every permanent resident in Switzerland 18 years and up (20 years prior to 1996) 4 is subject to income taxation and has to fill out a tax return every year (every second year before the reform). To include all tax units filing a tax return, the "normal cases" (Normalfälle) as well as the "special cases" (Sonderfälle) must be considered. 5 The latter include cases not only where a betwixt assessment was necessary (see section IIB) but also high-net-wealth individuals taxed according to their expenditures (Besteuerung nach dem Aufwand) and are thus highly relevant in the top income groups. 6 Married and officially registered couples are subject to joint tax liability and show 3 In recent years, officially published tabulations have been less detailed, with a top income bracket of only CHF200,000 and excluding the "special cases" (Sonderfälle). However, more detailed tabulations, as used in this study, are still available on request from the Federal Tax Administration. 4 Art. 14 ZGB. 5 Schaltegger and Gorgas (2011) include normal cases only from 1971 onward, so our results are not directly comparable to theirs.
6 See online appendix D for further details.
up as a single unit in the tax statistics. This means that a tax unit is not always an individual and does not necessarily correspond to the concept of a household. Although according to the definition above every permanent resident is subject to income taxation, the rate of filers covered is below 100%. Three groups of individuals are not covered in the statistics. The first group consists of those whose taxable income was not high enough to surpass the amount of exemption. Thus, although tax units with no or very little income have to hand in a tax return, they do not show up in the statistics if their tax liability is 0. Because the purpose of this paper is to study incomes at the top, this is only a minor problem. The second group not covered in the statistics consists of individuals taxed at the source. These are foreign nationals living in Switzerland but with only a temporary resident permit. Only when their income exceeds a certain threshold (around CHF120,000 in 2012) are they required to file a tax return ex post, which ensures that top earners are nevertheless included in the statistics. The third special category of residents are staff of international organizations based in Switzerland, who are exempted totally or partially from personal income taxation. This applies to no fewer than 24 organizations, 22 of them located in Geneva. These individuals, as well as their incomes, are therefore not covered in the statistics.
It is important to note that apart from these three groups that do not show up in the statistics due to their special legal status or low income, people who simply do not hand in their tax return, even though they are required to do so (i.e., true nonfilers) do show up in the statistics. 7 In such cases, cantonal tax administrations simply attribute to these individuals an income based on older tax returns and on employers' information about their income. True nonfilers are then taxed according to this imputed income without any deductions and are also subject to a fine.
Definition of income. All incomes from employment and self-employment, as well as capital income and transfer payments such as old age pensions, are subject to the personal income tax. Home owners living in their own house also have to report the value of an imputed rent (the so-called Eigenmietwert). Realized capital gains on private assets, however, are excluded from the definition of income. Overall, no distinction between labor and capital income is made. This implies some limitations for analyses carried out with the Swiss tax data for, as Piketty and Saez (2006) state, economic mechanisms can be very different for the distribution of labor and capital income. We try to circumvent this limitation with the analysis of top labor incomes using social security data in section V.
Expenditures related to the realization of income, as well as health insurance premiums and mortgage interest 796 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS payments, are subject to deductions. Because the tax liability for a married or officially registered couple is calculated on their combined income, these taxpayers can claim a deduction if both contribute to the household's income. Additional deductions can be made for children and other dependents living with the family. Our series are based on Reineinkommen (or revenu net, which literally means "pure" or "net" income; for detailed information and definitions, see the explanations in the introduction to the tax statistics) reported in the tax statistics. This corresponds more or less to some notion of gross income after itemized deductions but before personal deductions (Sozialabzüge). Most important, this income definition has remained stable over time and is the same top shares that Dell et al. (2007) is based on.
D. Total Income Denominator and Total Tax Units
Because not all tax units residing in the country are covered in the statistics, the same is true for the totality of incomes earned in a given period. The extent of underestimated total income in the tax statistics can be assessed by relating the total of declared incomes to an exogenous measure of total income in the economy, such as net national income reported in the national accounts. The ratio of reported tax income to the net national income started at around 72% in 1981 but then fell over time to a low of 60% in 2006, rising again afterward. It is thus necessary to accurately estimate total personal income, which is then used as the denominator to calculate the top group's income shares. We closely follow the approach adopted by Dell et al. (2007) , assigning the tax units not covered in the statistics 20% of average personal income reported in the tax statistics (i.e., 20% of the average Reineinkommen). This reasonable assumption further guarantees a high level of comparability with the existing series, so our update should not cause a break in the series. (See online appendix D for further details.)
The income denominator containing the imputed incomes for nonfilers fluctuates somewhere between 65% and 74%. These results are in line with those reported by Dell et al. (2007) . This remaining gap can at least partly be explained by tax evasion, which, according to a study by Feld and Frey (2006) , varies between 12.6% in 1978 and 35.1% in 1990 and lies somewhat above 20% on average. There are also considerable cantonal differences that change from year to year (between 1970 and 1995) . The average across all cantons in 1995 was 22.3%. However, we have reason to believe that the behavioral patterns of tax evasion remained relatively stable among the top groups over time (see the discussion in section IVB).
To accurately calculate the percentage shares of the top income groups, the same argument as for the total income applies: because not all tax units are contained in the tax statistics, it is necessary to calculate the total tax units in the country. Formally, the total number of tax units consists of the adult population minus half of the married adult population. We construct this number using register data, which is available on a yearly basis at the federal and cantonal levels for the time span considered in this study. 8 We follow the same approaches to construct the number of total tax units and the total income denominators at the cantonal level. Only the number of married adults at the cantonal level is interpolated linearly; data on married adults are not available on a yearly basis.
III. Estimating Top Income Shares in Switzerland from 1981-1982 to 2010
A. Pareto Interpolation
Since tax data are given in absolute income brackets, the income of a given quantile must be estimated by falling back on parametric assumptions about the income distribution. There is ample empirical evidence that incomes at the top of the distribution are approximately Pareto distributed. 9 Assuming that incomes are Pareto distributed, the cumula-
with k > 0, a > 1, and s ≥ k where the parameters a and k have to be estimated. Consequently, the probability density function takes the form
, the average incomeȳ(s) of tax units with income larger than or equal to s is given
· s. This is a central characteristic of the Pareto distribution: expected income above a given threshold s is a factor b = a/(a − 1) times the threshold s; the factor is constant and independent of the threshold s itself. It is possible to estimate the parameter a if one knows the number of tax units above a given threshold s and their average incomeȳ(s).
To estimate the top shares, we follow the approach suggested by Piketty (2001) and adopted by Dell et al. (2007) in their study on top income shares in Switzerland from 1933 onward, thus guaranteeing comparability of the series. Using the local Pareto distribution parameters a and k within a given income bracket, the income thresholds of each top group and their average and total incomes are estimated. The latter is used to calculate the share in total income for the corresponding top group. Details on the estimation procedure are outlined in online appendix D.
B. Cantonal Top Shares
For the years where data at the federal level are missing, we estimate the national income shares using cantonal top shares, based on federal income tax statistics at the cantonal 14% 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 Year Share of Total Income 20 cantons BS Switzerland VD, VS, TI ZH, TG Top income shares for different cantons, grouped into regions according to the point in time when cantons changed from prae-to postnumerando taxation. The underlying tax statistics were first aggregated at this regional level before the corresponding top income shares were computed using the Pareto interpolation method.
Source: Federal income tax statistics, own calculations.
level. The latter are available throughout the reform period with the exception of the two years before the change to the praenumerando method. Figure 1 shows the income shares for the top 1% group in Switzerland and several cantons from 1981-1982 to 2008 . Cantons that changed their tax system on the same date are pooled together-Zurich and Thurgau (ZH, TG); Vaud, Valais, and Ticino (VD, VS, TI); and Basel-Stadt (BS); and the group of the remaining twenty cantons. So instead of speaking of cantonal series, what follows is based on series for geographical areas that do not need to comprise only one canton. An advantage of these aggregated series is that they are less sensitive to changes in the composition of the underlying population and idiosyncratic changes of individual top incomes. Note how Basel-Stadt, a small canton in terms of population, exhibits higher volatility in top income shares.
In the years for which national data are available, the cantons reveal similar trends as those at the national level. Note that the top shares within the cantons correspond to total cantonal income-to the income distribution within each canton. So although the Swiss distribution clearly depends on the distribution within each canton, the Swiss top shares cannot be obtained by simply averaging cantonal top shares. 10 The next step is to accurately estimate the values for these missing years. The first method exploits the variation in top shares using only the available cantons and excluding the cantons for which data are missing in a given year ("imputation"). Comparing this value to the value when including all cantons shows the influence of the excluded canton on the Swiss series, and the variation can then be used to impute the missing years. Because the gap is ten years and different cantons are available in different years, the imputation is done in a consecutive way and based on different cantonal series.
C. Estimating Top Income Shares for the Transition Period
Second, we use OLS with cantonal fixed effects to estimate the relation between the national and cantonal top income shares for the years 1981 to 2008. Using linear forecasting (i.e., using the estimated coefficients), we estimate the missing values for the Swiss series from the cantonal series. For each year, we regress the series for Switzerland on the maximum number of cantons available. Table D. 3 in the online appendix shows the different models estimated for each year. The last row indicates the years for which each model was used to obtain the predicted values.
An alternative to the previous two techniques is the synthetic control method of Abadie et al. (2010) . Their original motivation for the use of synthetic controls was to estimate the effect of a policy change in one region compared to the absence of the policy. The idea is to compare the evolution of an outcome variable in the affected region to its hypothetical evolution if the policy intervention had not taken place. Instead of just comparing the region of interest to a similar control region, the synthetic control region is constructed out of a whole set of potential control regions (for more details, see Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Abadie et al., 2010 Abadie et al., , 2015 Bechtel, Hangartner, & Schmid, 2016) . Similar to the analysis of the evolution of an outcome variable after a policy change, here the question is, What would we have observed if we had the tax data for Switzerland as a whole? The 798 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS predicting variables used are all top groups' income shares, the corresponding income thresholds to belong to a top group, and the average income above a threshold. In addition, GDP and population growth rates, GDP per capita, and the unemployment rate are included. (For details on the predictors and weights used, see tables B.1 and B.2 in appendix B.)
The synthetic control method exhibits the theoretical advantage that the implied weights of the subgroups (in our case, the cantons) must be between 0 and 1. With OLS or imputation, this is not guaranteed (see Abadie et al., 2015) . Empirically, the synthetic control method has the advantage that the estimated time series has a lower volatility than the one derived from the other methods. Furthermore, the estimated income series better fits the labor incomes series, which are available in all years. The results throughout the paper are therefore based on the synthetic control method. We discuss the (small) numerical differences between the three imputation methods in online appendix E.
IV. Results: Top Income Shares in Switzerland
A. The Evolution between 1981/82 and 2010
Main finding: An upward trend. Figure 2 shows that the share of income going to the top income earners increased from the 1980s to 2010, and the previously missing years 1995 to 2002 are no exception. Yet there are differences between the top groups, with larger increases further up in the income distribution. 11 While the top 10% group experienced an increase of 13% over the whole period, the increase for the top 1% was 27% and added up to 100% for the richest 450 tax units belonging to the top 0.01% (see table 1 ). These cumulative growth rates were even larger in 2008 for most of the top groups, the year right before the outbreak of the global financial crisis. Figure 2c also suggests that it is the higher percentiles in the income distribution that tend to have more volatile earnings, which is confirmed by the variance of periodical growth rates reported in table 1.
Swiss top income shares are strongly correlated with the business cycle. The last recession covered in the data is the so-called 2001 dot-com bubble. After a peak in 2000, we observe a drop in income shares for all top groups. The dynamics are slightly different between the very top and the top decile as a whole. For the latter group, income shares fell in 2001 and 2002 but then also recovered quickly: in 2005, they had reached prerecession levels and continued to rise (see figure 3a) . Farther at the top, the drop was steeper, yet the recovery still happened almost as quickly as for the top decile as a whole. However, despite these differences, by the end of the time span covered, all groups attained shares in total income above any level reached before.
Research on top incomes suggests that these have become more cyclical since the 1980s (Saez, 2013) . Using a panel of sixteen countries, Roine et al. (2009) find that growth benefits the top 1% group the most, while Guvenen, Ozcan, and Song (2012) , who use a large panel of individuals in the United States for 1978 to 2011, find that those belonging to the top 1% and 0.1% experienced the largest income drop when entering a recession. In fact, their drop in income is larger than for those in the 90th percentile. Guvenen, Kaplan, and Song (2014) further find that the top 1% in the United States had more volatile income than the rest of the population, but that this difference cannot be explained by business fluctuations alone. They find that the volatility varies by industry: the finance, insurance, and real estate industries are the most cyclical for the top 1% earners.
This picture is in line with income distribution theories, which attribute a higher volatility to more disperse distributions, especially at the top (see Neal & Rosen, 2000 , for an overview). Another possible explanation for the observed higher volatility at the very top lies in the relative importance of capital income combined with the different composition of wealth at the very top compared to the top groups in the lower percentiles: the share of wealth held in corporate stock increases at the very top of the wealth distribution, while the share of other assets generating more stable returns, especially real estate, decreases with wealth, as evidence from the United States shows (Kopczuk & Saez, 2004; Saez, 2006) .
Long-run development.
As the series presented in this study are constructed following the approach of Dell et al. (2007) , we can combine our results with theirs to obtain top income shares series from 1933 to 2010. As shown in figure 3 , top income shares remained remarkably stable over this period. This is especially true for the two decades from the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. Thereafter, we observe a steady increase; some top groups, such as the top 10%, by the end of the last decade had reached the highest share in total incomes they had ever experienced.
The long-term picture also provides further evidence for a steeper increase at the very top of the income distribution. Figure 3c shows how the top 0.1% outperformed neighboring groups, especially in the last decade for which data are available. Figure C .1 in the online appendix makes this point even clearer by comparing the top 10% within the top 10% (i.e., the top 1% of the entire population as a share of the top 10% group) and within the top 1% group, respectively. While these within-group shares were more or less equal from 1933 to the beginning of the 1970s, the top 10% within the top 1% started to rise and drift away thereafter. Similarly, the ratio of the average income of the tax units of each top group relative to the total average income has been steadily increasing since the mid-1990s, after having reached its trough in the 1970s and 1980s. For the top 0.01% of tax units (the 450 richest households in Switzerland), average earnings climbed up to 180 times the average earnings in the economy-an unprecedented level.
International comparison. In comparison to the experience of other countries, the top 1% income shares in 5% 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 11% 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 Switzerland have remained fairly stable since the 1930s, with a dip at the end of the 1960s. When top income shares in the U.S. started to shoot up in the 1980s, Switzerland underwent an experience similar to its neighbors Germany and France, which both experienced an extremely stable evolution in top income shares. This picture changes when looking at the top 0.01% groups depicted in figure 4b . This group comes much closer to the U.S. experience with a pronounced increase starting in the 1990s and reaching unprecedented levels in 2007.
B. Robustness Checks
Is it a data phenomenon? System change and tax evasion. The change from the biennial to the annual assessment of incomes has only minor quantitative effects. There is no visible jump in the top shares, and even though they started to rise after 1993, the rise was slow in the beginning and can be seen as the beginning of an era of increasing top income shares that became especially pronounced from the end of the 1990s onward. Using individual federal income 800 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 35% 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 the fact that betwixt assessments had been increasing prior to the reform, gradually leading to more annual assessments already under the biennial tax regime.
A potential concern is that the observed increase in top income shares is driven by a decrease in tax evasion. This could be due to the prevalence of electronic payment systems or because top tax rates in Switzerland have been decreasing, thereby reducing the incentives to evade taxes. Several aspects speak against this conjecture. First, the fraction of nonfilers was increasing over the period of our study. This is consistent with the findings in Feld and Frey (2006) , according to which tax evasion varied between 12.6% in 1978 and 35.1% in 1990. Second, officials from different cantonal tax administrations confirmed our view that tax evasion has not decreased over time; some officials from the administration even suspect an increase in tax evasion. Third, while in some cantons the change to the postnumerando taxation was accompanied by the introduction of new IT systems, allowing better cross-checking of tax return data, the drawback of the yearly assessment seems to be that tax collectors have less time to investigate suspicious cases. Yet all the officials we spoke to agreed that income tax evasion is an offense mostly committed by low-and middle-income households. They argued that for top earners, the issue is more the evasion of wealth taxes and casual income (earned abroad). Overall, it is not plausible that the observed increase in top income shares is due to more compliance.
High-income foreign residents and other special cases in the data.
Switzerland is known to be an attractive country for high-income residents. The so-called special cases in the Swiss tax statistics, which are included in our estimates, are therefore of particular interest. There are two important groups: expenditure-based taxpayers (i.e., the "tax deals") and tax units with taxable income below ratedetermining income. The latter case emerges when taxpayers have incomes already taxed abroad (e.g., foreign real estate) or tax units not subject to taxation in Switzerland for a full fiscal year (e.g., tax units who emigrate). Information on taxpayers generating income in several countries is a particular feature of the Swiss tax data. 14 Expenditure-based taxation is available to foreign taxpayers who relocate to Switzerland under the condition that they do not work in Switzerland. Swiss citizens can opt for this special treatment in their first year of residing in the country after an absence of at least ten years and again under the condition of not pursuing any kind of work in Switzerland. Expenditure-based taxpayers are taxed according to their own and their Swiss-based dependents' living expenditures rather than according to their income. The sum of these expenditures has to equal at least five times the (imputed) rent (in case of homeowners). For taxpayers living in hotels, pensions, or homes for the elderly, the tax base has to equal at least twice their expenditures for room and board. In addition, a control calculation makes sure that the tax is not lower than the regular tax on Swiss income sources would be-namely, real estate income and all kind of capital income, patents, and pensions from Swiss sources. Incomes from abroad are taken into account if the taxpayer claims an exemption from the foreign income tax.
THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
Contrary to common wisdom, expenditure-based taxpayers do not get a special tax deal in the sense that they negotiate over a different tax rate. Their tax base is simply calculated on their expenditures rather than their income. 15 This sum of expenditures is then taken as the base to calculate the tax as if it were taxable income. If applicable, a taxpayer proposes expenditure-based taxation not only because she wants to decrease the tax burden but also to reduce the costs associated with tax filing. If income streams are a complex mix of different sources from different countries, opting for an expenditure-based tax deal may be less costly, and it guards taxpayers from coming under suspicion of tax fraud in other countries, since they legally pay their full taxes in Switzerland (Weibel, 2014) . Therefore, it is not a priori clear whether this tax base, which enters our top income share estimates as income, is larger, smaller, or much smaller than actual income would be. Although we expect these taxpayers' income to be larger than their reported tax base on average, there is at least some anecdotal evidence that expenditure-based taxpayers sometimes pay more taxes than they would on a regular basis. When the canton of Zurich abolished the expenditure-based taxation in 2010, about half of the 201 expenditure-based taxpayers left the canton; among those who stayed, only 47 (i.e., approximately 50%) paid higher taxes (Finanzdirektion Kanton Zürich, 2012) .
The second special group are taxpayers where the ratedetermining income does not equal taxable income, mostly because they earn income abroad, which must be taken into account to calculate the tax rate. In these cases, the Swiss tax rate is calculated on all of their income, but it is applied only to the income taxable in Switzerland. Again we cannot know by how much the statistics underestimate true income, but it is possible to report these cases. Figure 5 shows the importance of expenditure-based and special tax units among the top 0.1% group. In quantitative terms, special cases with global rate-determining income higher than their income taxed in Switzerland are much more relevant within the top income groups than wealthy foreigners taxed according to their expenditures, and their share has been increasing since the 1970s. Not surprisingly, the share of special cases increases toward the top of the income distribution. This fact entails two interesting findings. First, top income earners in Switzerland are more prone to have incomes from abroad than the average taxpayer, a finding that becomes stronger toward the very top of the income distribution. Furthermore, the share of individuals earning income abroad has increased substantially over time, notably among very top groups. While in the 1970s, around 12% of the top 0.1% income earners were "special cases," by 2010 this share increased to 34%. In our view, this goes hand-in-hand with the observation that while Switzerland has a relatively equal wage distribution, inequality at the top resembles the Anglo-Saxon countries more. The very top income earners are truly global: they seem to be able to take advantage of globalization more than the average, and their income process follows the corresponding worldwide trends for top incomes. Second, the presence of tax deals does not play a central role for a possible downward bias of top income shares. Very rich people with income sources from abroad seem to find attractive tax conditions in Switzerland even without a special tax deal. For our overall results, these findings indicate that our estimates on the evolution of top income shares should be taken as a lower bound and that the bias arising from special cases with several international income sources becomes larger for groups at the very top.
V. Driving Factors of Top Income Shares: Labor versus Capital Incomes and the Distribution of Wealth
Our picture of top income shares so far is based on total income. To better understand the driving factors behind the observed patterns, the next step would be to decompose total income into labor and capital income. The Swiss tax data do not allow such a distinction, but other sources do allow a closer look at the evolution of labor and capital incomes separately. For the former, we make use of the old age insurance statistics (AHV-Statistik), and for the latter, we rely on estimates from wealth statistics. There is only limited cantonal information on how labor and capital income are correlated, so the discussion that follows is an educated conjecture of how the income composition within top groups has changed over time.
A. The Increasing Importance of Labor Incomes
The AHV statistics contain the full earnings information for all employees and self-employed on a yearly basis. Moreover, as contributions to the old age insurance are not capped but are levied on total labor income (including all wage components, such as equity pay), all labor incomes legally earned in Switzerland are covered. Because the AHV statistics are a full sample, it is possible to obtain the percentile values of interest directly from the data. The obtained top income shares therefore correspond to the true shares within the labor income distribution (as opposed to total income in the case of the top shares estimated with tax statistics). An important difference between social security and tax statistics is that the former relies on individuals, whereas the latter is based on tax units. To the extent to which the correlation between top incomes and household structure did not change, the evolution of top labor incomes may be directly compared to the evolution of total incomes. Hence, if top labor incomes grew faster than total incomes, labor incomes would have become relatively more important among the very top income earners. Figure C. 2 in the online appendix shows the top labor income shares together with total top income shares from the income tax data. They clearly follow the same patterns, with the latter being higher for every top group at every point in time. Labor income is therefore more equally distributed than total income.
The AHV statistics further allow us to decompose labor income into wages paid to employees and income of the self-employed (figure 6). Not surprisingly, the self-employed at the very top have particularly high shares of the total income generated by all self-employed, also because some businesses generate only very low profits. 16 For both categories, we observe again an upward trend starting in the mid-1990s, as well as an inverse U pattern between 1999 and 2003, reflecting the boom and recession related to the dot-com bubble in 2001. Similar to what we observe in the tax data covering all incomes, these patterns become more pronounced farther up in the income distribution. This is even more so in the case of the self-employed, who experience stronger fluctuations as their incomes depend more on common economic trends than employees' incomes.
The rise of top employees. The top self-employed and employees' incomes have grown differently since 1981, as depicted in figure C.3 in the online appendix. While for the top 10% and (to a lesser extent) the top 5%, it is true that entrepreneurs performed best when it came to securing large income shares, the increase in top employees' income shares is stunning. For the top 0.01%, it more than tripled over the observed period, compared to the shares of the top self-employed, which less than doubled. These changes over time are of course limited, as the shares themselves are bounded above. Nevertheless, the distribution of labor earnings in Switzerland has been undergoing remarkable changes since the beginning of the millennium. While up to the mid-1990s, the evolution of top incomes was similar for entrepreneurs and employees at the very top, employees also benefited from a steady increase in their income shares. The top incomes of employees rose by more than 55%, whereas total top income shares rose by only 30%. Taken together, this implies that while there has been a general increase in earnings inequality at the top as top income shares have been on a steady rise, this increase has been steeper for employees' incomes than for the incomes of the self-employed and total incomes measured by the tax data.
Further, we observe again that earnings at the top have become more volatile. This makes sense if we think of high self-employed earnings containing a risk premium, while 804 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Year Income Share in Percent Employees Labor income (employees and self employed) Self employed (a) Top 1% income shares of employees and self-employed 6% 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Year Income Share in Percent Employees Labor income (employees and self employed) Self employed (b) Top 0.1% income shares of employees and self-employed Labor income shares of the top 1% and top 0.1%, respectively, of all working individuals, employees, and self-employed. Self-employed not completely and finally assessed after 2008. The income denominator is total labor income, total employee income, and total income of the self-employed, respectively.
Source: AHV-Statistik, own calculations.
for employees, wages can be seen as more predictable and stable. If now the increase at the top is partly due to more volatile salary components such as stock options and equity pay, top paid employees like CEOs will also bear part of the firm's risk. Note, however, that the upward trend still remains, as the declines are sharp but smaller than the increases. This pattern is consistent with the empirical literature, showing that CEOs are paid for luck but are not punished for poor outcomes (Bertrand & Mullainathan, 2001 ). The question is why we observe such a surge only after the mid-1990s. The literature has proposed market-driven explanations such as skill-biased technological change, which has favored top earners (see, e.g., Gabaix & Landier, 2008) . Others have claimed that it is the institutional setting that matters and that changed after the Reagan/Thatcher era, which was followed by a wave of liberalizations in many spheres (Pontusson, 2005) . Related to this institutional view is a broad literature considering the effects of tax rates on top incomes. Piketty, Saez, and Stantcheva (2014) present an overview of the different effects from taxation on top incomes along with a model including different margins of behavioral responses to taxation. The innovation of their model is that it includes top earners' responses of bargaining over pay, in addition to the standard supply-side and tax-avoidance responses to taxation.
To gain more insights into the Swiss case, we follow Gabaix and Landier (2008) and study the correlation between top labor incomes and the market capitalization of listed companies as a share of GDP. Figure 7 shows the striking result: the stock market capitalization of Swiss firms rose from around 70% of GDP to well over 250% of GDP in a short time period between the early 1990s and 2007. Table F 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 like the Netherlands and of larger countries such as France or Germany. Swiss stock market capitalization as a share of GDP is even higher than Luxembourg's in most of the years. The rise corresponds very well with the increase in top labor income shares (dotted line in figure 7 ). The correlation between the two series is 0.745 and statistically significant at the 1% level.
B. Top Wealth Shares and Capital Incomes
The second driver of top incomes are capital incomes. Our estimates of the evolution of capital incomes are much cruder than the estimates of labor income. To gain at least an idea of how the distribution of capital incomes has evolved, we look at the evolution of wealth inequality. Assuming that returns to capital do not vary systematically among the top groups, the evolution of wealth inequality is a good proxy for the evolution of capital income inequality. Figure C. 4 in the online appendix shows the top wealth shares from Dell et al. (2007) , updated to 2011, estimated analogously to the top income shares. Wealth reported in the tax statistics is net (gross wealth minus liabilities) and relates to tax units (as in the case of incomes). Both panels of figure C.4 show that as with top income shares, top wealth shares started to increase again in the 1990s, with the increase becoming more pronounced in recent years and further up the income distribution. If we disregard the spike in the late 1930s, which is most probably caused by an influx of wealthy immigrants fleeing from the Nazis , wealth shares of the top 1% group have risen to levels comparable to the postWorld War I period. Top 0.1% wealth shares have even risen so significantly since the early 2000s that they have reached unprecedented levels.
The numbers have to be interpreted with care, however, as pension accounts are tax free and therefore not included in the tax statistics. 17 Individuals accumulate funded pension 17 In addition, the tax value of real estate is typically lower than market value. For the middle class, residential property constitutes a large part of wealth through mandatory wage deductions through the employer ("second pillar"), and through optional individual contributions ("third pillar"). Annual contributions to both systems are capped. Their growth throughout the twentieth century and in particular since their general introduction in 1984 leads to an overestimation of wealth concentration over time and in international comparison. While in 1969, the share of pension wealth in overall wealth amounted to 20%, it increased to 37% in 2011. To get a sense of how this affects top wealth share estimates, we compute two alternative wealth share estimates taking into account pension wealth. In both approaches, the total wealth denominator consists of taxable wealth plus all pension funds. 18 In the first approach, each tax unit is assigned the average pension wealth; that is, we assume that pension wealth is equally distributed and adjust the nominator accordingly. This series therefore constitutes a lower bound for the wealth concentration. Our estimates, however, need not be too far from reality, since pension wealth is of lower importance for very wealthy individuals. This is confirmed by Bütler, Peijnenburg, and Staubli (2016) , who, based on SHARE (Survey of Health Ageing and Retirement in Europe) data, find no correlation between nonpension wealth and pension wealth in Switzerland. We have three possible explanations for the low correlation finding. First, pension wealth can their wealth. The Swiss National Bank (SNB) collects data on financial and real estate assets by households since 1998 (excluding commercial property owned by individuals). Comparing the SNB data series with the tax data shows no divergence between the two series. Changes in top wealth shares are therefore not driven by changes in the assessment of real estate. The practice differs between cantons, but real estate is valued at 70% to 100% of market value (decision by the Swiss Federal Court BGE 128 I 240), and market value is reestimated every ten to fifteen years. If we set households' real estate value at 80% of market values calculated by the SNB, taxable wealth amounts to 85% to 90% of the wealth calculated by the SNB, after correcting for pension wealth (see below). For details, see table F.2 in the online appendix. 18 We use two data sources for pension wealth: data before 1999 are taken from Leimgruber (2008) , based on the Federal Pension Fund Statistics, and data since 1999 are based on the SNB, Swiss Financial Account, table 14. Wealth, 1913 Wealth, -2011 Wealth, 40% 60% 80% 1910 Wealth, 1920 Wealth, 1930 Wealth, 1940 Wealth, 1950 Wealth, 1960 Wealth, 1970 Wealth, 1980 Wealth, 1990 Wealth, 2000 Wealth, 2010 Series of shares in total wealth of different top wealth groups and shares in total wealth corrected for funded pension wealth. In the 1930s, coverage of wealth in tax statistics was particularly low, possibly leading to larger noise in the top wealth share estimates than in other periods.
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Source: Wealth tax statistics (ESTV), pension wealth statistics (1925 ( -1996 ( : Leimgruber, 2008 , top wealth shares (1913 ( -1997 be cashed out at retirement (but also to buy a house or start a business). Tax incentives make it more profitable for rich people to cash out their pension wealth. Hence, many wealthy individuals have only taxable nonpension wealth but no pension wealth left. Second, individuals with relatively low pension wealth may compensate by saving outside the public pension system. Moreover, for high-income earners, pension contributions are capped above. Finally, individuals with high levels of wealth may decide to work less and therefore accumulate less pension wealth. In the second approach, we add to the nominator of each top wealth group the share in total pension wealth the same top group has in total labor incomes. The top 10% of workers, for example, have on average a labor income share of 28%; hence, the top 10% of the net wealth distribution are assigned 28% of pension wealth in addition. Since we have top labor income shares only for the years 1981 to 2010, we use the average labor income share of each top income group during this period for all the years. Since labor income and pension wealth conceivably have a low correlation, this second approach provides a conservative upper-bound estimate for the wealth concentration including pension wealth.
The results are depicted in figures 8a and 8b. The quantitative effect of including pension wealth is very large. Assigning each taxpayer average pension wealth (dotted lines), the wealth share of the top 10% drops from 74% to 47%, and the top 1% share drops from 40% to 25% in 2011. As expected, assigning proportional rather than average pension wealth has the strongest impact on the top 10%, increasing their wealth share by roughly 7 percentage points in 2011. For the wealthiest 0.1% in contrast, the difference between the two methods is negligible. These corrected levels in top wealth shares are much more comparable to the wealth concentration in other countries with similar income concentration. In France, for example, top wealth shares equal 62% and 23% for the top 10% and top 1%, respectively (Piketty, 2014) . Furthermore, our corrected series show a secular downward trend in the wealth distribution, quite similar to other industrialized countries.
Nevertheless, we observe an increase in the top 1% and the top 0.1% since the mid-1990s in both the uncorrected and the corrected series. In fact, the rise in the top 10% wealth share is due to the increase of the top 0.1% alone. It is interesting to confront this fact with our finding that the share of globalized incomes among top income earners has risen. The SNB collects data for offshore wealth held by Swiss (and foreign) residents since 1998. 19 Between 1998 and 2007, we see a strong co-movement of offshore wealth and top wealth shares. The value of offshore portfolios at current prices almost doubled from US$554 billion in 1998 to US$1.083 trillion in 2007. The share of offshore wealth in total wealth as measured by the SNB rose from 32% to 43% in that period. Looking at securities only, the share of foreign issuers quickly exceeded that of domestic issuers in the year 2007. After the financial crisis, the value of foreign assets decreased and stabilized at around US$1 trillion, which amounts to 31% of total wealth. However, as Zucman (2013) 
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigated the evolution of top income and top labor income shares in Switzerland. In particular, we have closed the data gap between 1993 and 2003 that arose because the cantons changed their tax systems at different points in this time frame.
Our results show that top income shares in Switzerland have increased, with stronger increases at the very top: the top 1% income share rose from 8.5% in the late 1980s to 11% in the late 2000s, whereas the top 0.1% share increased from 2.9% to 4.2% in the same period. Together with the large increase, the very highest incomes also exhibited the largest volatility over the business cycle.
We also compared the income data from tax statistics with labor income data from social security statistics, for which we obtained the percentiles directly from the register data. We find that inequality among the best paid workers (employees and self-employed) rose sharply as well, with the same time trend as the estimated values for total top incomes. The latter finding underpins our estimates of total income shares for the missing years 1995 to 2002. Furthermore, the share of top labor incomes grew faster than total top incomes. In this respect, Switzerland follows the trends of other industrialized countries, where labor income has been found to have become more important among the top income groups (Atkinson et al., 2011) .
The increase in top wealth shares has been more moderate than the increase in top income shares. Only the top 0.1% of the wealth distribution substantially increased their share in total wealth, reaching unprecedented levels in the past decade. The concentration as well as the increase in top wealth shares, however, is reduced substantially once we correct for funded pension wealth.
Summing up, we find that inequality among the very top resembles more the experience of Anglo-Saxon countries. This coincides with our finding that the very top income earners in Switzerland are truly global: they seem to be able to take advantage of globalization more than the average, and their income process follows the corresponding worldwide trends for top incomes.
Further research is needed to investigate the hypothesis that falling top marginal tax rates could partially explain the rise of incomes at the very top of the distribution. Falling tax rates, especially in a country with strong direct democratic institutions, might be correlated with more fundamental changes in values. If, following the Reagan/Thatcher era, more free-market-oriented values were adopted in politics and by the general public, this could also help explain trends in increasing pay at the top, combined with the emergence of incentive-based remuneration schemes. Such schemes can both enhance efficiency and camouflage rent-seeking behavior. Using individual data, it would be possible to investigate patterns of CEO compensation across industries over time in Switzerland. We leave these considerations for future research.
APPENDIX A
Data Sources Tax Statistics
Data set with grouped tax data provided by Raphaël Parchet, Università della Svizzera italiana USI. Original source: Federal Tax Office. This data set contains variables for each of the cantons plus Switzerland for the tax periods 1983-1984 up to 2010, except for 1987-1988 , for which raw data are completely missing. The lower bounds of the income brackets for this data set are (in CHF) 60,000 70,000 80,000 (up to year 2000) 90,000, 100,000, 120,000, 150,000, 200,000, 300,000, 400,000, 500,000, 1 million, and 2 million. For each income bracket, the total number of tax units (Normaland Sonderfälle) and their total income within each bracket are reported.
Old Age Insurance Statistics (AHV-Statistik)
Data provided by Hans Peter Naef, Zentrale Ausgleichsstelle der AHV (ZAS), Geneva. We obtained tabulations with the requested percentile threshold values, the income sum above that threshold, the median within each threshold, along with total incomes and the total of insured persons for each year for the groups of employees, self-employed and all insured working persons taken together. We also obtained grouped tabulations with the same income brackets as in the tax statistics.
Wealth Statistics
Grouped tax data of net wealth with income brackets from 0 up to CHF10 million and above. Data downloadable from the Federal Tax Administration's website: https://www.estv.admin.ch/estv/de/home/allge mein/steuerstatistiken/fachinformationen/steuerstatistiken/gesamtschw eizerische-vermoegensstatistik-der-natuerlichen-person.html.
VOLATILE TOP INCOME SHARES IN SWITZERLAND?
APPENDIX B
Additional Tables   Table B1. The table presents the synthetic control predictors used for the estimation of each top group's income share, along with corresponding means in actual and synthetic Switzerland.
